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A General Framework for Competitive
Analysis in Wireless

Telecommunications
by
J. GREGORY SIDAK,* HAL J. SINGER,** AND DAVID J. TEECE***

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 sets forth extensive
provisions to "unbundle" the local telecommunications network to
encourage the development of a competitive market for local
telephony.' It would seem to have been an unstated premise of those
statutory provisions and the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) rules interpreting them that the task of unbundling is one that
should take place in a technological vacuum. Although the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ostensibly removed artificial
regulatory distinctions based on the particular technology employed
to produce a communications service, the administrative rulemakings
and federal court litigation that have dominated the first three years
of experience under the new statute have focused on the traditional
wireline access network and have seemingly ignored the fact that,
over the same period, wireless telecommunications has rapidly
matured as a substitute for wireline access. If regulators were to
acknowledge that development, the entire exercise of wireline
unbundling could become irrelevant.
Wireless local telephony already provides a substitute for
wireline access. It is therefore highly pertinent for a symposium on
* F.K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow in Law and Economics, American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research; Senior Lecturer, Yale School of Management.
** Senior Vice President, Criterion Economics LLC.
*** Mitsubishi Bank Professor, Haas School of Business, and Director, Institute for
Management, Innovation and Organization, University of California, Berkeley. We thank
Carlo Cardilli, Ana Kreacic, and symposium participants for their helpful comments.
1. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-52 (Supp. 1996). For detailed discussions of this open-access
regulation, see J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS
AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACr: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF
NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997), and Robert G. Harris & C.

Jeffrey Kraft, Meddling Through: Regulating Local Telephone Competition in the United
States, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1997).
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interconnection, such as this one, to consider the FCC's policies that
artificially constrain the market structure for wireless
telecommunications services. The Supreme Court's 1999 decision in
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,2 reversed the FCC's unbundling
rules for incumbent local exchange carriers to the extent that the
agency failed to establish a reasonable standard for determining
whether it is "necessary" to unbundle a particular element and
whether the failure to unbundle that element would "impair" an
entrant's ability to compete in the provision of local
telecommunications services.3 In this Article, we propose a general
wireless
in
competition
for
evaluating
framework
Although our analysis has immediate
telecommunications.
ramifications for wireless telecommunications policies-such as
spectrum caps and mergers of wireless carriers-the same analysis can
shed light on the question of whether, or for how long, it is
"necessary" to mandate the unbundling of even the copper loop,
which constitutes the element of the wireline network that is
considered the least susceptible to duplication by competitors. If
wireless is indeed an access substitute for wireline copper loops, and if
wireless thus permits the competitive supply of bundled services that
are satisfactory substitutes in consumers' minds for the typical bundle
of services that consumers have until now demanded in conjunction
with standard wireline access, then Congress, the FCC, the state
public utilities commissions, and the courts must ask: Is the great
experiment of mandatory unbundling of telecommunications
networks worth the candle?
That consequential question emerges from the analysis that we
employ to study a seemingly narrower issue of wireless
telecommunications policy. By regulation, the FCC has limited to 45
M, z the amount of commercial mobile radio services (CMRS)
spectrum that may be licensed to a single entity within a particular
geographic area.4 As the Commission stated in its 1998 notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) concerning possible relaxation of the
spectrum cap, "a single entity may acquire attributable interests in the
licenses of broadband Personal Communications Service (PCS),
cellular, and Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) services that
cumulatively do not exceed 45 M-Hz of spectrum within the same
geographic area."5 We formulate, in this Article, a decision rule that
2. 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
3. Id.at 377.
4. See 47 C.F.R. § 20.6 (1998).
5. In the Matter of 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Spectrum Aggregation Limits
for Wireless Telecommunications Carriers, 13 FCC Rcd 25,132 (1998) (Notice of Proposed
Rule Making adopted Nov. 19,1998) [hereinafter Spectrum Cap NPRM].
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would assist the Commission in deciding whether or not to retain the
spectrum cap and, thereafter, in evaluating competition in wireless
telecommunications generally.
We employ decision-theoretic analysis to determine whether the
expected costs of retaining the 45 MHz spectrum cap exceed the
expected costs of removing it. The expected costs of removing the
The probability of either
spectrum cap are negligible.
monopolization by a single firm or collusive pricing by a group of
firms is near zero due to the growing tendency of carriers to adopt
nationwide pricing plans and because capacity is a function of both
spectrum and equipment. In contrast, the expected costs of retaining
the spectrum cap are substantial as wireless services evolve from
mobile voice to fixed voice and data applications. The probability
that a single carrier would use more than 45 MHz is nontrivial,
because the growth in demand due to consumers' desire for bundled
service offerings and the invasion of wireless carriers into fixed
communications markets will together severely burden existing
networks. In short, a cost-benefit analysis demonstrates that the
spectrum cap should be abolished because the expected costs of
retaining the spectrum cap vastly exceed the expected costs of
removing it.
The application of decision-theoretic analysis to the issue of
spectrum cap policy can easily be generalized to deal with a broad
range of competitive policy issues in the wireless industry. We restate
the decision rule in terms that can be applied to numerous wireless
policy issues. For example, regulators may have to decide whether
newly merged firms should be forced to divest themselves of wireless
properties in overlap territories. The issue of divestiture is treated in
similar fashion to the spectrum cap analysis. Not surprisingly, may of
the same factors that influence the spectrum cap analysis resurface in
the merger analysis.
In Part I of this Article, we explain our decision-theoretic rule for
determining whether the spectrum cap should be retained. In Part II,
we estimate the expected costs of removing the cap and describe the
magnitude of those costs in qualitative terms. In Part III, we present
the same analysis with respect to the expected costs of retaining the
cap. In Part IV, we compare the expected costs of retaining and
removing the spectrum cap. In Part V, we demonstrate the general
applicability of our decision-theoretic approach to competitive policy
in the wireless communications industry. We conclude by noting how
the increasing substitutability of wireless and wireline services is
blurring the definitions of relevant market in the telecommunications
industry-a development that has direct implications for whether,
and how much, to mandate unbundling of the incumbent wireline
network.
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L An Application of the Decision-Theoretic Framework to
Spectrum Cap Policy
Decision theory is a branch of the social sciences that explores
the issue of making optimal decisions in complex environments. 6 We
employ decision-theoretic analysis to determine whether the expected
cost of retaining the FCC's 45 MvHz spectrum cap exceeds the
expected cost of removing it. The expected cost of any random event
is the product of the probability of the event and the associated cost
given that the event occurred. For example, if the probability of a
successful robbery with the front door open is 10 percent and the
valuables in the home are worth $10,000, then the expected loss from
leaving the door unlocked is $1,000 = .10 x $10,000.
The frequency and severity of the errors that might arise under
the existing policy regime (the 45 MHz spectrum cap) must be
weighed against the frequency and severity of the errors that might
arise under the alternative policy regime (abandonment of the cap).
We believe that such an approach is consistent with Commission's
first principle for deciding whether to eliminate the spectrum capforces generally better
"that trusting in the operation of market
7
serves the public interest than regulation."
The spectrum cap decision unavoidably will entail two kinds of
expected social costs. The first is the loss in consumer welfare
resulting from the failure to prevent the successful exercise of market
power by a single firm, or a group of firms acting in explicit or tacit
collusion, plus the associated enforcement costs of remedying that
loss in the absence of the cap. The second is the efficiency loss that
would ensue if at least one carrier would have chosen to use, for
procompetitive or efficiency-enhancing reasons, more than 45 MHz of
spectrum inthe absence of the cap, plus the associated enforcement
costs of remedying that loss in the presence of the cap.
The cap should be abolished if the expected costs of retaining the
cap exceed the expected costs of removing it. This principle is simply
a variant on the argument, familiar in antitrust policy, that a liability
rule should minimize the combined costs of false positives (Type I
errors), false negatives (Type II errors), and the costs of
administration. 8 Eminent economists such as Kenneth J. Arrow,
6. For a general explanation of the decision-theoretic framework, see JEANJACQUES LAFFONT, THE ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION (1995); and
DAVID M. KREPs,A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 71-120 (1990).

7. Spectrum Cap NPRM, supra note 5, at [5.
8. See Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Frameworkfor Analyzing Predatory
PricingPolicy, 89 YALE LJ.213, 223 (1979); Frank H. Easterbrook, PredatoryStrategies
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William J. Baumol, and Paul W. MacAvoy have extended that
economic reasoning to the optimal design of telecommunications
regulation.9 A Type I error is the failure of the Commission to deter a
harmful event-namely, the loss in consumer welfare resulting from
monopolization by a single firm of a particular geographic region or
collusion by a group of firms in that geographic region. In contrast, a
Type II error is the failure of the Commission to allow a beneficial
event-namely, the efficiency gain that would be realized when a
single carrier uses more than 45 MHz of spectrum for a
procompetitive or efficiency-enhancing purpose.
It is important to note that the spectrum-cap problem could just
as easily be cast as maximizing the expected gains from the two types
of fortuitous events. The expected loss associated with the Type II
error (namely, the loss in productive efficiencies due the increase in
the minimum efficient scale) is equivalent to the productivity gains
that might occur should the cap be removed. Likewise, the expected
loss associated with the Type I error (namely, the loss in consumer
welfare due to monopolization or collusion in a geographic region) is
equivalent to the gain in consumer welfare that might occur should
the cap be retained.
The expected cost of removing the spectrum cap equals the
product of (1) the probability that a large carrier or a cartel of carriers
will exert market power within a particular region and (2) the sum of
the associated loss in consumer welfare and the enforcement costs of
remedying that loss. We designate as a Type I error the event in
which government policies would fail to deter a single firm, or. a
group of firms acting collusively, from exercising market power within
a particular region after the removal of the 45 MIHz spectrum cap.
The expected cost of keeping the spectrum cap is the product of (1)
the probability that the minimum efficient scale for at least one firm
exceeds the spectrum cap and (2) the sum of the efficiency losses and
and Counterstrategies,48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,318-19 (1981); Richard C. Schmalensee, On
the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The ReaLemon Case, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 994,
1018-19 n.98 (1979); J. Gregory Sidak, Debunking PredatoryInnovation, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1121, 1144-45 (1983). These scholars in law and economics in turn borrowed the
construct of Type I and Type II errors from hypothesis testing in statistics. See, e.g., PAUL
G. HOEL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 108-09 (4th ed. 1971).
9. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN
LOCAL TELEPHONY 131-32 (1994); PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST
AND REGULATION TO ESTABLISH COMPETITION IN MARKETS FOR LONG-DISTANCE

TELEPHONE SERVICES (1996); Kenneth J. Arrow et al., The Competitive Effects of Line-

of-business Restrictions in Telecommunications, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 301,
305 (1995) (explaining that the "goal of public policy in telecommunications should not be
simply to minimize potential regulatory problems but instead to maximize net benefits to
society."). See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 CAL. L. REV.
1209, 1216-17 (1993).
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the enforcement costs of remedying those efficiency losses. We
designate as a Type II error the event in which the continued
enforcement of the spectrum cap would prevent at least one firm
from achieving a minimum efficient scale that exceeded the 45 MHz
spectrum cap.
It is useful to formalize the conceptual process by which the
Commission would optimally define its spectrum-cap rule. The
proper goal should be to maximize consumer welfare, which can be
achieved at an operational level if the Commission seeks to minimize
the total costs C:

C

error
p (L, + A, ) a Type I
{ q (Lq + Aq) aType II error

where
P

Lp

=the probability that the Commission fails to deter
a single carrier, or a group of carriers acting
collusively, from exercising market power (that
is, the probability of a Type I error)
=the consumer welfare loss associated with a Type I
error

ApP=the

enforcement costs of remedying damages in
the event that a single carrier or a group of
carriers exerts market power

q

=the probability that at least one carrier would have
chosen to use more than 45 MHz of spectrum
(that is, the probability of a Type II error)

Lq

=the efficiency loss associated the Type H error

Aq

=the enforcement costs of remedying damages in
the event of a Type II error

In the following pages we explore in qualitative terms the magnitudes
of the probability of the Type I and Type II errors and their
associated social costs.
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H. The Expected Costs of Removing the Spectrum Cap
A.

The Probability That the FCC Fails to Deter a Single Carrier, or a
Group of Carriers Acting Collusively, from Exercising Market Power

The probability of a Type I error (that is, the probability that,
once the cap is removed, the FCC fails to deter a single carrier, or a
group of carriers acting collusively, from exercising market power) is
close to zero. As we explain in this Part, at least seven considerations
support that conclusion. First, competition in wireless services is
robust and is expected to strengthen. Second, a rational firm must
consider the pricing reactions of its rivals while contemplating any
price increase. Given the growing tendency of carriers to adopt
nationwide pricing plans, it is highly unlikely that such a price
increase would induce competitors to raise prices in a given location.
Thus, any attempt by a firm to monopolize wireless services in a
particular region would cause its revenues to fall, because existing
customers would flock to the lower-priced national carriers. Third, a
rational carrier would recognize that even a smaller rival in the same
region could absorb virtually all of the first carrier's traffic given the
current technology. Fourth, because capacity is a function of both
spectrum and equipment, any exercise of market power would
require virtual monopolization of both the spectrum and
telecommunications equipment markets.10 Given the independent
ownership of telecommunications equipment and services firms, this
event is highly doubtful. Fifth, ease of entry into the wireless voice
and data services market undermines the ability of any single firm, or
any group of firms acting collusively, to exercise market power. Sixth,
the durable nature of spectrum would render any attempted
monopolization or collusion futile. Seventh, warehousing of spectrum
services industry.
is not a feasible means to monopolize the wireless
11
We now consider each of these seven factors.
(1) Competition in the Wireless Services Industry

In an attempt to spur competition in the U.S. wireless industry,
10. This presumes that other carriers in the region have at least some spectrum.
11. The likelihood of a Type I error with respect to collusion is low not only for all the
reasons that we will address, but also for the absence of familiar predisposing
characteristics for successful collusion-such as uniform prices, penalties for price
discounts, advance notices of price change, information exchanges, and delivered pricing.
See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 416-17 (2d ed. 1994); RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIc NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 33638 (2d ed. 1981).
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the FCC in the mid-1990s auctioned spectrum for a second generation
of wireless service known as personal communication services (PCS).
The first major broadband PCS auction (the "A & B Auction")
closed on March 13, 1995.12 The second (the "C Auction") and third
(the "D, E & F Auction") broadband PCS auctions closed on May 5,
1995, and August 26, 1996, respectively. 13 The amount of spectrum in
each auction varies from 10 MHz in the D, E, and F bands to 30 MHz
in the A and B bands.
At the time of the spectrum auctions, the FCC imposed several
constraints on the ability of firms to aggregate spectrum in a given
geographic region. First, the Commission created a 45 MIHz spectrum
cap on any combination of broadband Personal Communication
Services (PCS), Specialized Mobile Radio Service (SMR), and
cellular licenses. 14 The FCC justified the cap as a means of stabilizing
the marketplace without sacrificing the benefits of procompetitive
and efficiency-enhancing aggregation. If a carrier were to aggregate
sufficient amounts of spectrum, the Commission reasoned, it would
be possible for the carrier to "exclude efficient competitors, to reduce
provided, or to increase prices to
the quantity or quality of services
u5
the detriment of consumers.'
In addition to creating the spectrum cap, the FCC imposed other
constraints on the ability of a single carrier to aggregate spectrum.
For example, the FCC placed restrictions on the ability of cellular
carriers to bid in the PCS auctions. 16 The Commission also set aside
two entrepreneurs' blocks, C and F, to ensure that "designated
entities" had an opportunity to participate in the provision of
broadband PCS. 17 The designated-entities set-asides, cellular PCS
cross-ownership restrictions, and spectrum cap represented a strong
effort on the part of the FCC to diversify ownership in the wireless
industry.
Aggregation rules, like the spectrum cap, are no longer
12. For the full schedule and summary of spectrum auctions, see Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau, U.S. Federal Communications Commission, Auction Charts
(last modified July 22,1999) <http:llwww.fcc.gov.wtb.auctions/>.
13. See id.
14. See 47 C.F.R. § 20.6 (1998).
15. Spectrum Cap NPRM, supra note 5, at 10.
16. The Commission "retain[ed] [its] cellular attribution threshold of 20 percent equity
ownership of a cellular licensee and [its] service area overlap test of 10 percent of the
population of the relevant PCS market, so that the same entity generally may not own
more than 20 percent of a cellular license, and not more than 5 percent of a PCS
license(s)." In the Further Order of Consideration, 59 Fed.Reg. 55,372 (1994) (citing New
Personal Communications Services, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,832 (1994) (to be codified at
47 C.F.R. Pts. 2,15,24)).
17. Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act-Competitive
Bidding, 59 Fed. Reg. 37566 (1994) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 24).
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necessary, as competition in the wireless industry is robust. Before
the auctions, no region in the country was served by more than three
wireless carriers.18 As early as June of 1998, 273 of 493 basic trading
areas (BTAs), representing 87 percent of the U.S. population, were
served by three or more competitors.' 9 Four or more20 carriers served
135 BTAs, representing 69 percent of the population.
In addition to this actual competition, potential competition is
substantial. The number of competitors will continue to rise as
winners of the D, E & F Auction enter the industry. For example,
Sprint launched service in Jacksonville, Tampa, and St. Petersburg in
1998 and is planning to introduce service in Atlanta, Chicago,
Cincinnati, Houston, Richmond, and Orlando early 1999.21

In

Chicago and Houston, Sprint represented the sixth wireless carrier as
of the end of 1998. Local exchange carriers have also entered as
wireless providers in areas where they have had a wireline presence.
BellSouth entered Tampa-St. Petersburg in October 1998, with
expansion planned into the neighboring counties.22 By late 1998, U S
WEST had entered Phoenix, Denver, and Portland, Oregon, and
planned thereafter to expand into the surrounding areas north
through SeattleP3
Finally, the entrance of PCS carriers is placing significant
downward pressure on wireless prices. Industry afialysts expect prices
of cellular service to continue to fall as PCS firms continue to start
operations. Indeed, the expected rate of decline in cellular prices has
accelerated over the last few years. Figure 1 shows forecasts of
cellular service prices (in constant dollars of revenue per minute of
use) prepared by Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette ("DIJ"). DLI
expects cellular prices to continue declining by substantial amounts
over the next several years. 24 A comparison of DLJ's 1996 and 1998
forecasts shows that cellular prices have fallen even more rapidly than
DLI expected as recently as 1996.

18. This includes the two cellular carriers and potentially Nextel, which began offering
digital mobile telephone service in August 1993. For a complete description of Nextel's
development, see 1998 FCC ANN. REP. 16 [hereinafter THIRD ANNUAL REPORT].
19. See U at 19.
20. See id.
21. See Sprint PCS, Current News Releases (visited Feb. 1, 1999)
<http:llwww.sprintpcs.comlnews/1999/index.html>.
22. See BellSouth Corporate Information Center, Newsroom (visited Feb. 1, 1999)
<http:lwww.bellsouthcorp.comlheadlinesl>.
1999)
1,
Feb.
(visited
Center
News
West
U.S.
23. See
<http://www.uswest.comlnews/commarchive.html>.
24. See DONALDSON, LUFKIN & JENRETrE, THE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY 20 (spring 1998 ed.) [hereinafter DLJ REPORT].
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FIGURE 1: DECLINE IN FORECAST PRICES FOR CELLULAR
SERVICE
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Source: DONALDSON, LUFKIN & JENRETrE, THE WIRELESS

COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 16 (summer 1996 ed.); DONALDSON,
LUFKIN & JENRETrE, THE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY

20 (spring 1998 ed.).
(2) The Ability of Nationwide Carriersto Raise PricesSelectively in
ParticularRegions

The geographic scope of wireless markets has increased over
time due to an increasing degree of integration between regional
markets and to the emergence of national carriers and pricing plans.
Carriers have attempted to create a nationwide footprint through
of
acquisitions
spectrum,
complementary
of
purchases
a
With
complementary firms, joint ventures, and leasing agreements.
singlehave
launched
virtually nationwide footprint in place, carriers
rate plans to lure customers from competing cellular services and
even wireline services. The FCC has identified footprint expansion as
a major operational trend in the wireless industry.25 As evidence in
support of this trend, the Commission in May 1998 cited the
announcement by SBC Communications to acquire Southern New
England Telecommunications Corp. and its cellular licenses and
Nextel's acquisition of Pittencrieff, the second largest SMR operator
at the time.26 After its recent sale to SBC, Brian Roberts, president of
Comcast Cellular "acknowledged the trend toward national and
global competitors in the wireless industry." 27
25. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 18 at 16.

26. See id. at 17.
27. Colleen McElroy, Comcast purchase opens Northeastfor SBC presence, HOUS.
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Examples of nationwide pricing are abundant. Nextel, a
"maverick" firm, introduced a "no roaming" plan in January 1997. 28
Established providers have responded to Nextel's innovation. Sprint
launched its national plan in early 1998, 29 and AT&T Wireless
followed suit in May 1998.30 Bell Atlantic and AirTouch began to
offer single-rate plans in September 1998.31 The presence of such
nationally advertised "one-rate" plans substantially reduces (or
eliminates) any concern that carriers could amass spectrum in an
effort to extract monopoly rents in any given region.
Any rational firm considering a price increase must contemplate
the response of its rivals in the same region. Given the high likelihood
that at least one of those rivals employs a nationwide pricing plan, the
expected payoff of any price increase by a local carrier will always be
less than the expected payoff under no price increase. A nationwide
carrier would be insensitive to local changes in prices. Thus, any
unilateral price increase would induce the immediate exit of
customers to the lower-priced nationwide carrier. 32 Recognizing that
futile outcome, the firm would not attempt the localized price
increase.
(3) CapacityIs a Function of Both Spectrum and Equipment

It is erroneous on economic grounds to purport to measure the
capacity of a wireless firm on the basis of spectrum alone. Rather,
capacity is a function of at least two variables-spectrum and
equipment. It is natural to consider the tradeoff between spectrum
and equipment while keeping a constant level of capacity. Thus, a
single firm attempting to monopolize a particular region, or any
group of firms colluding to raise prices there, would have to dominate
both the available supply of spectrum and the available supply of
capacity-expanding equipment.3 3 Table 1 shows that the wireless
telecommunications equipment manufacturers have substantial
market capitalizations. It is highly improbable that a single carrier, or
CHRON., Jan. 21, 1999, at 1.
28. See Nextel Launches Floridaand Ohio Valley Markets, PR NEWSwIRE, July 31,

1997.
29. See Elizabeth Douglass, Telecom Talk 'Roaming' Era Nears Its End, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 1998, at B6.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. This example assumes that the price of the local carrier is originally greater than or
equal to the price of the nationwide carrier. Even if the opposite were true, consumers will
be inclined to drop the local service because the product offering of the nationwide carrier
is superior.
33. It is important to note that there is no cross-ownership whatsoever between the
major wireless service carriers and telecommunications equipment firms.
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even a cartel of carriers, could coordinate arrangements with all the
requisite equipment providers so that a smaller rival in the same
location could not augment its capacity through equipment upgrades.
As Table 1 shows, monopolization of the wireless equipment industry
by wireless service firms would be next to impossible.
Table I:Wireless Equipment Manufacturers and Market
Capitalization
Company

Market
Capitaliz.

Profile

(U.S. $ B)

Alcatel

Andrew
Corporation

19.1

1.7

Ericsson

44.5

Glenayre
Technologies

0.3

Harris
Communications

3.1

Lucent
Technologies

145.5

Manufactures wireless equipment
and systems, including wireless
access systems, mobile networks,
microwave radio etc.
Manufactures base station
antennas, antenna, microwave and
wireless systems, microwave
transmission lines.
Develops and manufactures
systems and terminals for private
radio systems and customerspecific mobile data solutions for
GSM and Mobitex, wireless
handsets and accessories, switches
and various wireless systems for
network operators.
Manufactures paging infrastructure
and devices, enhanced services for
mobile and fixed networks, spread
spectrum and microwave radio and
equipment.
microwave radio
Manufactures
systems and wireless local loop
telephony systems.
Manufactures wireless networks,
third generation systems, and
services systems and software
which enable network operators
and other service providers to
provide wireless access, local, long
distance and international voice,
data and video services and cable
service.
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Manufactures wireless handsets,
wireless data networks, digital and
Motorola
41.3
analog cellular telephone
networks, wireless software and
modules.
Supplies telecommunications
systems and equipment. Core
businesses include the
Nokia
83.5
development, manufacture and
delivery of operator-driven
infrastructure solutions and enduser-driven mobile phones.
Designs, develops, manufactures,
markets, sells, finances, installs and
services fully digital
37.4
Nortel
telecommunications systems,
including phones, switches and
software.
Designs, develops, manufactures,
markets, licenses, and operates
Qualcomm
4.5
digital wireless communications,
infrastructure and subscriber
products, designs and services.
Manufactures advanced terrestrial
Scientific2.1
and satellite network products and
Atlanta, Inc.
systems to deliver voice, data and
video communications services
Manufactures many wireless
solutions such as digital trunk
Tellabs
16.9
translators and various products
that support need to expand
capacity of existing facilities
Manufactures satellite
communications systems,
Titan
0.2
information technology solutions,
Corporation
and sterilization systems and
services for commercial and
government customers worldwide
Note: Market capitalization downloaded from http://www.yahoo.com
on Jan. 18, 1999.
(4) The Capacityof a Single Alternative 10 MHz Carrier

At present, digital PCS systems using code division multiple
access (CDMA) technology-the most spectrally efficient technology
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commercially available today-build their systems in units of capacity
called "carriers." Each carrier requires approximately 2.5 MHz of
spectrum. In addition, guard bands are required on both ends of the
spectrum to prevent interference. Therefore, a PCS provider can
build three carriers in a 10 MHz block of spectrum. Initially, each
provider builds out a single carrier, but as subscribers and peakperiod usage expand, a second carrier is installed. PCS providers
using CDMA technology in the A and B blocks, which were
auctioned in 1996, are only now beginning to install second carriers
for use in 1999. 34 As of February 1999, no wireless carrier had begun
to deploy a third carrier, and few are expected to do so in the
foreseeable future.
Suppose a single firm tried to monopolize a particular region by
first gaining a large share of the available spectrum and then raising
prices. Based on the aforementioned capacity of spectrum, one 10
MIz block of spectrum would be sufficient to provide a wireless
carrier with the ability to satisfy the current demand for wireless voice
services. Thus, so long as there remained at least one 10 MHz carrier
in the same region willing to match the old price of the larger firm,
that smaller firm would be poised to absorb most of the larger firm's
traffic due to the technological capabilities of spectrum management.
Recognizing the ability of a smaller rival to absorb its traffic, the large
firm would not proceed with a price increase, as the expected payoff
of high prices and no customer base would be less than the expected
payoff with lower prices and its existing customer base.
Perhaps the best evidence that 10 M z is sufficient spectrum to
allow a firm to be competitive in the present wireless voice industry is
the experience of Nextel. Operating with an average of 14 MHz of
spectrum in each region (which, for technological reasons, is roughly
equivalent to a 10 MHz PCS block of spectrum), Nextel has become a
dynamic competitor, providing innovative services and leading in the
development of a uniform nationwide pricing plan.35 As Figure 2
shows, Nextel now operates with systems that can reach 100 percent
of the population in the ten largest MSAs, 90 percent of the
population in the fifty largest MSAs, and more than 81 percent of the
population in the 100 largest MSAs.

34. Sprint has begun to deploy second carriers in the largest metropolitan areas for use
in early 1999. GTE and Bell Atlantic are considering such a deployment for 1999.
35. In the fourth quarter of 1998, Nextel added 372,500 domestic subscribers, bringing
the total to 2.8 million. See Sarah Schafer, Nextel Improves 4th-QuarterResult, WASH.
POST, Feb. 24,1999, at E3.
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FIGURE

2: MARKETS IN WHICH NEXTEL OPERATES
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Source: Based on an analysis of Paul Kagan & Associates data.
The future viability of a 10 MHz carrier depends on the
projected demand for wireless offerings. At very high levels of
demand, a carrier with only 10 MHz of spectrum would have to invest
more in additional equipment than a competitor in the same region
with 20 MHz of spectrum. This tradeoff point, however, is well in
excess of predicted penetration levels of roughly 40 percent over the
next several years. 36 Therefore, one 10 MHz block of spectrum in the
possession of a rival carrier is sufficient to deter any attempts at
monopolization for several years to come.
(5) FallingEntry Barriers

For several reasons, ease of entry undermines the ability of
either a single firm to exert market power in wireless services or any
group of firms successfully to collude to raise prices. First, to compete
in the wireless industry, firms need spectrum, capital, and access to
tower sites. Given the rapid advances in transmission technology,
spectrum requirements for existing services are now much lower
relative to the total amount of spectrum available. Moreover, the
amount of spectrum potentially available to wireless competitors
could increase beyond the current 180 MHz of cellular, PCS, and
36. These forecasts are: Yankee Group (37.9%); Paul Kagan (41.4%); Strategis
(42.9%); and Dennis Leibowitz of Donaldson, Luflkin, and Jenrette (38.9%).
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ESMR spectrum. For example, the lower eighty blocks of ESMR
spectrum remain to be auctioned. 37 Second, to our knowledge, there
is no evidence of capital market imperfections in the wireless
industry. If there were any such imperfections, the FCC's generous
bidding credits for designated entities would, if efficacious, have
compensated for any borrowing difficulties encountered by small
firms. We are not aware of any evidence that those bidding credits
failed to work as intended in this respect.
Third, although the costs of building wireless systems to use the
available spectrum are not small, technological progress is reducing
the total cost of such systems. As Figure 3 shows, the incremental cost
of building cell sites has declined steadily for almost a decade.
FIGURE 3: INCREMENTAL COST OF BUILDING CELL SITES
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Source: CTIA Semi-Annual Data Survey (June1989-June 1998).
In addition, the cost of tower siting is becoming less of a barrier
to entry. Independent tower management companies-such as
American Tower, Omni America, Crown Castle, and TeleCom
* 37. In phase I of the ESMR auctions, the Commission licensed the upper 200 blocks of
ESMR spectrum. In phase II, the Commission will auction the lower 80 blocks. Federal
Communications Commission, Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR): SMR Upper 200 Fact
Sheet, <http:lwww.fcc.gov/wtb/auctions> (visited January 18,1999).
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Towers-are becoming important suppliers of tower sites. As a result,
entrants can lease these facilities rather than buy sites on their own.
Independent cell site operators (ICOs) increase the overall
availability of towers by permitting collocation on the same tower of
rival operators, making the cell site management function more
efficient.38 ICOs increase the availability of cell sites by removing the
incentive of an incumbent carrier to refuse to deal with an entrant.3 9
As long as profits for site management continue to grow, one would
expect ICOs to facilitate entry into the wireless business. 0 In
conclusion, any carrier considering monopolization would have to
recognize the competitive threat of potential entrants.
(6) DurableNature of Spectrum

For attempted monopolization of wireless services to be
profitable, a wireless carrier would have to be able to raise prices
above current market levels at some future date. Those price
increases would have to remain in effect for a nontransitory period
and be large enough to compensate the carrier for the profits forgone
by holding prices at predatory levels to injure its remaining rivals.
Even in the improbable event that a single carrier could drive one of
its rivals into bankruptcy, the spectrum of that carrier would remain
intact, ready for another firm to buy the capacity at a distress-sale
price and immediately undercut the carrier's noncompetitive prices.
Thus, the durable, or long-lived, nature of spectrum would serve as a
powerful deterrent against any attempts at monopolization. In 1996
the FCC embraced, with respect to newly enacted section 272 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the logic of such skepticism toward
hypothesized predation by an incumbent local exchange carrier
directed toward interexchange carriers operating fiber-optic
networks.41 That conclusion accords with the findings of many
respected regulatory economists 42 If the argument is true for long38. See BRADLEY WILLIAMS, LEGG MASON WOOD WALKER, INC., INDEPENDENT
WIRELESS TOWER OPERATORS: REACHING NEW HEIGHTS 15 (1998).
39. For example, Bell Atlantic and BellSouth recently agreed to sell off its towers. See
Nicole Harris, BellSouth Corp. Sells 1,850 of Its Towers To Crown Castle in $610 Million
Deal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10,1999, at B4.
40. For example, U.S. RealTel Inc., a Chicago-based firm that claims to be the nation's
largest telecommunications properties landlord, collects between 25 and 35 percent of the
rates that it negotiates for tenants. See Jon Van, An Industry Sprouts from Rooftops:
RealTel Handles Leasing of Building for Phone Companies' Antennas and Lines, CHI.
TRIn., Nov. 19, 1998, at B1.
41. Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, 11 FCC Rcd. 18,877, 18,943 1 137 (1996)
(adopted Jul. 17, 1996) (citing Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications, 12
YALE J. ON REG. 25, 60 (1995); other citations omitted).
42. See, e.g., PAUL W. MAcAvoY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION
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lived fiber capacity, then it holds with even greater force for an
infinitely durable resource such as spectrum.
(7) Warehousing of Spectrum

Warehousing of spectrum is not a feasible means to monopolize
the wireless services industry. As explained earlier, a single carrier
could not expect to limit the capacity of its rivals by depriving them of
one input in the production process. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, warehousing of spectrum is not a profitable endeavor.
Any resources devoted toward the hoarding of spectrum could not be
deployed in other ventures. The opportunity costs of such behavior
would be large, as firms could alternatively invest in such profitable
ventures as mobile Internet access. In addition, any urge to
warehouse spectrum would be outweighed by the desire to sell the
asset for cash. Suppose a firm with 100 MHz of spectrum was
considering selling 10 MHz. To the extent that returns to spectrum
were decreasing at such high levels, the usage value of the first 10
MHz of spectrum for a spectrum-constrained rival would far exceed
the usage value for the warehousing carrier. Thus, to hoard spectrum
would entail forgoing an immediate cash flow equal to the difference
in those two private values. Moreover, the expense of acquiring
spectrum to warehouse is one that the firm incurs immediately,
whereas the benefit to the firm (if any) of reduced competition occurs
over a number of future periods. Consequently, that stream of
anticompetitive benefits must be discounted at the firm's cost of
capital to produce a present value that can be compared with the
immediate outlay necessary to buy the spectrum to be warehoused.
Thus, in addition to being sensitive to all the technological factors
that will make spectrum relatively more abundant and capacious in
the future, the feasibility of the spectrum warehousing strategy will be
sensitive to all the factors that influence the firm's cost of capital. In
conclusion, it is unlikely that any firm would attempt to monopolize
the wireless industry through warehousing spectrum.

186-90 (1996);
Susan Gates et al., Deterring Predation in Telecommunications: Are Line-of-Business
Restraints Needed?, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 427 (1995); Paul S. Brandon &
Richard L. Schmalensee, The Benefits of Releasing the Bell Companies from the
Interexchange Restrictions, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 349 (1995); Jerry A.
Hausman, Competition in Long-Distance and TelecommunicationsMarkets: Effects of the
MFJ, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 365 (1995); Kenneth J. Arrow et al., The
Competitive Effects of Line-of-Business Restrictions in Telecommunications, 16
TO ESTABLISH COMPETITION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES

MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.

301 (1995).
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The Consumer Welfare Losses Associated with the FCC's Failure to
Deter a Single Carrier, or a Group of Carriers Acting Collusively, from
Exercising Market Power

It is possible to measure the cost of a Type I error-in the
unlikely event that it occurs-by estimating the loss in consumer
welfare due to higher prices. Assuming that it offers the same price to
all customers, the monopolist will always charge higher prices and
produce less output relative to a competitive equilibrium 4 3
Monopolization causes consumer surplus-the difference between
what consumer would be willing to pay and what they actually payto fall in two ways. First, by charging higher prices, monopolization
reduces consumer surplus by an amount equal to the product of the
change in price and the output under monopoly. 44 Second, by
restricting output, monopolization yields a deadweight loss by an
amount equal to the area under the demand curve with length equal
to the difference in output level between the monopoly and
competitive equilibrium.
An estimation of the loss of consumer surplus requires estimates
of the demand curve and the price charged by a hypothetical
monopolist. Professor Jerry Hausman of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology has estimated the slope of the industry demand curve
for cellular services and has found the own-price elasticity of demand
to be -0.41. 45 Using this estimate as a proxy for the elasticity of
demand for cellular and PCS services, the monopolist's reduction in
output can be measured by solving the formula:
7 = (QM -Qc )IQc =-0.41,
(PM-Pc)/Pc

where 77 is the own-price elasticity of demand for cellular and PCS

services; QM and Qc are the numbers of subscribers under the
monopoly equilibrium and the perfectly competitive equilibrium,
respectively; and PM and Pc are the prices of wireless services under

43. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 283-39 (3d ed. 1992). A
price discriminating monopolist will produce the same amount of output as a competitive
industry. Thus allocative efficiency is achieved, but the monopolist captures the entire
consumer surplus.
44. This component of the loss in consumer welfare is entirely appropriated by the
monopolist. Thus, one might argue that it should not be included in a social welfare loss
calculation.
45. See JERRY HAUSMAN, Valuation and the Effect of Regulation on New Services in
ACIvLrY:
ON ECONOMIC
PAPERS
Telecommunications, in BROOKINGS
MICROECONOMICS, Issue 1 (1997). To estimate the model, Professor Hausman collected
price and subscribership data for the period 1989-93 from a confidential survey of cellular

operators.
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the monopoly equilibrium and the perfectly competitive equilibrium,
respectively.
Based on the above formula, it is possible to calculate the loss in
consumer welfare associated with various price increases by a
hypothetical monopolist. Even in a scenario in which the hypothetical
monopolist raises prices substantially, the short-term loss in consumer
welfare appropriated by the monopolist would not be large. The
portion of consumer welfare that represents the deadweight loss
would be substantially less.
More importantly, the expected loss in consumer welfare would
be miniscule, as any welfare loss must be multiplied by the probability
of the Type I error. For example, suppose the loss in consumer
welfare is estimated to be L and the probability of the Type I error is
estimated to be 0.1 percent. Hence, the expected loss would be
L/1000. Stated another way, even a $1 million loss in consumer
welfare would be converted into only a $1,000 expected loss. We
believe that the probability of a Type I error would be vanishingly
small because any aggregation of spectrum licenses would necessitate
that an application for transfer of control first be filed with the FCC
for its public interest review. 46 Moreover, if the acquisition were
sufficiently large, the parties would be forced to give premerger
notification to the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice for their separate antitrust
review under the Hart-Scott-Rodino process. 47 These two reviews,
under separate standards, would make it virtually certain that any
harmful aggregation of spectrum would be detected before it could be
accomplished.
Furthermore, the losses (if any) from a Type I error would be
transitory due to regulatory action and market forces. Market forces
would drive the industry in the direction of competition. The
existence of monopoly rents combined with the low entry barriers
described above would induce rival firms to offer service in the region
at lower prices.
C. The Enforcement Costs Associated with the FCC's Failure to Deter a
Single Carrier, or a Group of Carriers Acting Collusively, from
Exercising Market Power
The FCC's elimination of the 45 MHz spectrum cap for CMRS
would not mean that providers of wireless services would be free to
hoard spectrum for anticompetitive purposes. The antitrust laws
would obviously still be enforced, just as the Department of Justice

46. See 47 U.S.C. §310(d) (1994).

47. See 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1994).
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has previously done in the numerous cases in which that agency has
been called upon to scrutinize competition in the wireless industry.48
Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, individuals are subject to
imprisonment and substantial fines, and corporations are subject to
even higher fines.49 Moreover, the Department of Justice is obviously
not alone in its enforcement of the antitrust laws. Private plaintiffs
may sue for treble damages,50 the deterrent effect of which has long
been recognized. 51 Finally, injunctive relief is available to correct
anticompetitive conduct.5 2 In light of these multiple waves of antitrust
defense, it is unnecessary for the FCC to defend consumer welfare by
prospectively prescribing, through retention of the 45 MHz CMRS
spectrum cap, the market structure for wireless communications.
It bears emphasis, however, that even the antitrust laws are a
default safeguard against any wireless service provider seeking to
monopolize the market or any group of firms seeking to cartelize it.
The first line of defense against anticompetitive conduct is always the
retributive threat of competition itself-from the many large, capable
firms that currently provide, or soon will provide, wireless services.
Those many firms-which can soon be expected to include a major,
new participant from abroad, Vodafone 3 -are not wallflowers. They
have significant financial resources, managerial capabilities, as well as
brand recognition and reputation.
D. Recapitulation

To summarize, we have shown here in Part II that the expected
costs of removing the FCC's 45 MHz spectrum cap are small. The
expected cost of removing the cap equals the product of (1) the
probability of a large carrier or a cartel of carriers will exert market
power within a particular region (that is, the probability of the Type I
error) and (2) the sum of the associated loss in consumer welfare and
the enforcement costs of remedying that loss (that is, the costs of the
Type I error). We have demonstrated qualitatively that the
probability of the Type I error is near zero and the associated costs of
48. See, e.g., Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement; United
States v. AT&T Corp. and McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc., 59 Fed. Reg. 44,158
(1994) (proposed July 15, 1994).
49. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994).
50. See id, § 15.
51. See, e.g., Michael K. Block et al., The DeterrentEffect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89
J. POL. ECON. 429 (1981); Michael K. Block, & J. Gregory Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust
Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?, 68 GEO. L.J. 1131 (1980); J.
Gregory Sidak, Note, RethinkingAntitrust Damages,33 STAN. L. REv. 329 (1981).
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1994).
53. See Laura M Holson, British CarrierWins Battle for AirTouch, Bell Atlantic Loses
Out To a $60 Billion Offer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1999, at B1.
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the Type I error are transitory and small. We next turn in Part I to
qualitative assessment of the Type II error, or the efficiency loss that
may occur if the minimum efficient scale for some firms exceeds the
45 MHz allowed by the spectrum cap.
H1. The Expected Costs of Retaining the Spectrum Cap
Suppose that the future demand for wireless services outstripped
the supply capabilities for any single carrier with 45 MHz because of
growth in demand for bundled service offerings of voice and data. In
that circumstance, some firms might optimally choose to use more
than 45 MHz of spectrum to satisfy consumer demand. In this section,
we explore the magnitude and severity of the errors that may occur if
the FCC interferes with the optimal choice of spectrum by preventing
spectrum acquisition over 45 MHz.
A. The Probability that the Minimum Efficient Scale for Some Firms
Exceeds the Cap
(1) Landline Displacementby Wireless Services

For two reasons, the future demand for wireless services may
require that some providers have more than 45 MHz of spectrum.
First, as wireless prices approach wireline prices, fixed (as opposed to
mobile) customers will begin substituting wireless telephones for
landline telephones. Some evidence today already indicates an
interest on the part of wireless carriers to serve fixed customers. As of
February 1999, AT&T currently offers digital wireless service in
Plano, Texas, in a package designed to attract customers interested in
second lines for their businesses or homes.54 By offering consumers a
$40 monthly package of unlimited local calling that is bundled with
voicemail, caller ID, call waiting, call forwarding, three-way
conferencing, and 10 cents-per-minute long-distance service, AT&T
may well position itself to attract second-line customers to its
standard wireless service.
The Yankee Group believes that substitution from wireline
service to wireless service begins to occur when the wireless-towireline price ratio is 3-to-1 or less. 55 The telecommunications
research firm points to Israel, Japan, and some Scandinavian wireless
56
markets as examples where landline displacement has occurred.
54. See Jennifer Files, AT&T to Upgrade its Network; Complaints Prompt Company to
Improve Wireless Service, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 13,1998, at ID.
55. See Yankee Group PricingStudy: All-Inclusive Wireless Rates Usher in the Era of
Landline Displacement,PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 4,1999.
56. See id.
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Another recent Yankee Group study that compared wireless and
wireline prices in several regions throughout the United States found
that migration from wireline service to wireless service begins

between 500 and 750 wireless minutes of use (MOU) per month for
users on an all-inclusive rate plan.5 7
We have independently calculated the possibility for similar

wireless-wireline competition in two other illustrative cities, Dallas,
Texas, and Bethesda, Maryland. In both cases, we used the lowest

current wireless rate for the average outbound traffic on a residential
line in that state and projected that this rate would decline at the

same rate as the rate of decline for average PCS prices estimated in
1998 by Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jenrette. 8 We used the current
wireline prices, including subscriber line charges, for local and long-

distance services. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the convergence-indeed,
the imminent crossover-of wireless and wireline prices in the two

regions.
FIGURE 4: CONVERGENCE OF WIRELESS AND WIRELINE
PRICES, BETHESDA, MD.
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<http:\www.yankeegroup.com/webfolder/yg2la.nsf/webpress>.
Wireless consumers
demanding less than 500 MOUs per month would not receive the same price per minute.
The study compared the all-inclusive and standard wireless rate plans for local and longdistance wireline rates in eight cities across the United States, including New York,
Boston, Dallas, Kansas City, San Francisco, Portland, Chicago, and Miami. The Yankee
Group assumed an average 1,000 wireline MOU to reflect the fact that, with the exception
of New York City, local wireline rates are unmetered; the Yankee Group then used this
average price per minute to compare it with various levels of wireless usage ranging from
60 to 1,200 MOU.
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Sources: Federal Communications Commission, Statistics of
Common Carriers, 1996-97 Edition. Bell Atlantic and Sprint rates
downloaded from

websites at http://www.bellatlantic.com and

http://www.sprintpcs.com on Dec. 19, 1998.
FIGURE 5: CONVERGENCE OF WIRELESS AND WIRELINE

PRICES, DALLAS, TX.
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Sources: Federal Communications Commission, Statistics of
Common Carriers,1996-97 Edition. AT&T Wireless rates downloaded
from website at http://www.sbc.com and http://www.attwireless.com on
Dec. 19, 1998.
Figure 5 implies that such substitution will occur in Dallas before the
that
end of 1999. Indeed, at least one recent press report suggests
59
landline displacement may be occurring in Dallas already.
(2) Consumer Demandfor Bundled Offerings of Voice and Data
The minimum efficient scale for some firms may exceed the
FCC's 45 MHz spectrum cap due to wireless consumers' increasing
demand for bundled offerings of voice and data. According to a
recent survey conducted by the Yankee Group, 15 percent of wireless
users are very interested in mobile data services, and 36 percent are
somewhat interested.6° Figure 6 shows the forecasted growth in
demand for wireless data services. Under its most conservative
estimates, the Yankee Group forecasts that the market for mobile
58. See DLJ REPORT, supra note 24.
59. See Bruce Upbin, Technology cut the cord, FORBES, Jan. 25,1999, at 56.
60. See The Yankee Group, Mobile User Survey Series: The Convergence of Mobile
Data and Computing (visited Aug. 17, 1998). <http://www.yankeegroup.com/>.
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data services may grow to 12.59 million users by 2002.61
FIGURE 6: U.S. MOBILE DATA MARKET FORECAST
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http://research.yankeegroup.comon January19, 1999.
Many industry analysts expect a convergence of voice and data
services over wireless platforms. The principal analyst in the mobile
and satellite group at Ovum Inc. recently stated that "data is an
integral component of the [third generation wireless] vision and will
provide a massive expansion of the wireless data opportunity." 62 The
Strategis Group predicts wireless Internet and email will become the
"killer apps" of the next century.63 In a 1998 survey, the Strategis
Group found that 30 percent of the respondents expressed interest in
a "small wireless device that could send and receive e-mail." 64
Another 35 percent were interested in receiving wireless email
services over devices "similar to a cellular phone or pager. '65 This is
powerful evidence of a growing demand for bundled wireless
61. See iL
62. Wireless Industry Roundtable DiscussionOn The Table: The Year in Review And A
Look Forward To The Future Of Wireless Data,WIRELESS DATA NEWS, Dec. 9, 1998, at
(remarks of John Davison) [hereinafter RoundtableDiscussion].
63. See The Strategis Group, Wireless Internet and E-mail Markets: 1998, at 1 (visited
Jan. 19,1999) <http:llwww/strategisgroup.com>.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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offerings of voice and data using new third-generation (3G)
technology.
There is also evidence that wireless carriers and equipment
makers are responding to this demand. BellSouth Wireless recently
added data services to its wireless service offerings. 66 Wireless
equipment manufacturers previously designed voice and data
networks under two distinct architectures. Recently, however,
telecommunications equipment companies such as Lucent have
begun to unite the architectures for voice and data.67
In light of consumers' demand for bundled offerings, the optimal
scale of spectrum capacity for some wireless firms may exceed the
spectrum cap. We next examine how cost-minimizing firms make
optimal input selections and analyze how the 45 MHz spectrum cap
may interfere with those decisions.
B. The Social Costs Associated with the FCC's Failure to Allow At Least
One Carrier to Use More Than 45 MI1z of Spectrum

In January 1999, the Cellular Telephone Industry Association
(CTIA) described the 45 MHz spectrum cap as "an impediment to
the efficient use of spectrum and the introduction of new services."' 6
We describe here three kinds of efficiency losses that would likely
arise from the FCC's continuation of the cap. First, the spectrum cap
may produce a misallocation of carriers' resources across equipment
and spectrum. Second, future competitive alliances may be based
more on complying with the FCC's spectrum cap than on maximizing
potential synergies. Third, the spectrum cap may deny consumers
lower wireless prices that would flow from firms' achieving economies
of scale and scope in the delivery of wireless services.
(1) Allocation of Resources Across Equipment and Spectrum

An artificial regulatory constraint on spectrum capacity can
induce a misallocation of resources across equipment and spectrum.
Figure 7 depicts the input choices available to a wireless carrier
seeking to minimize total costs.

66. See Roundtable Discussion,supra,note 62 (remarks of Fran Frith).
67. See Lucent Technologies Press Release, Lucent Technologies number one in
wireless office (visited Jan 20.1997) < http://www.lucent.com>.
68. CTIA Faults FCC Wireless Policies as Anticompetitive, MOBILE COMM. REP., Jan.
11, 1999, at *1.
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FIGURE 7: OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF EQUIPMENT AND
SPECTRUM FOR A COST MINIMIZING FIRM
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The curved labeled capacity isoquantrepresents all the combinations
of spectrum and equipment that would yield the same level of
capacity for the firm. The line labeled isocost line represents all
combinations of spectrum and equipment that would yield the same
level of total expenditures for the firm. A cost-minimizing firm

chooses to combine the inputs in such a way that the ratio of input
prices equals the ratio of marginal factor productivities.
Geometrically, this is equivalent to finding the point of tangency
between the isocost and isoquant. As Figure 7 shows, a firm facing
this particular technological tradeoff and these particular input prices
would naturally choose more spectrum than the FCC's cap allows.
Any deviation from the optimal, cost-minimizing point represents a
loss in productive efficiency. Due to the constraint imposed by the
FCC's 45 MHz spectrum cap, a firm could achieve a greater amount
of capacity while not increasing its total expenditures by substituting
away from equipment-that is, by trading equipment for spectrum at
the current level of input prices.
(2) The OptimalScope and Scale of the Firm

There are likely great economies of scale and scope in the
provision of advanced mobile data services. First of all, high-speed
data services will likely consume large amounts of bandwidth. The
required throughput is higher than voice to begin with, and
compression is less effective on data streams (which are likely to be
already compressed at their source) than it is on the pattern-rich
human voice. Second, offering a high-speed data capability is likely to
be an all-or-nothing decision. That is, there may be no such thing as a
minimal data offering. If a carrier were not to offer high-speed data at
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an intensive scale throughout a particular market region, it would
likely suffer the same fate of the current data protocols, which have
and build sufficient penetration to
struggled to gain user acceptance
69
justify the necessary investment.
Second, there are likely great economies of scope between the
provision of advanced data services and traditional voice-grade
services over the same wireless network. The data services would
likely share the same towers and other structures (for example, power
supply housings), the same backhaul transport routes, and potentially
the same antennas. Operators could then achieve other economies of
scope by marketing and billing these two types of services jointly.
Therefore, the development of advanced data services could lower
the costs of providing traditional voice-grade mobile service.
Although we do not know now what the optimal spectrum
bandwidth will be for the provision of advanced wireless data
services, it may well be far in excess of the current 45 MIHz spectrum
cap. One can envision the need for greater raw bandwidth using a
simple calculation. Suppose that an operator can satisfy future voice
demand with 10 MHz of spectrum. If 20 percent of the operator's
customers demanded mobile high-speed data with a 384 kbps average
throughput (twenty times the current voice-rate throughput), as a
rough approximation the raw bandwidth required would need to
increase to 480 percent of the original, or 48 MHz = (.20 x 20 + .80 x
1) x 10 MHz. Even more bandwidth would be required if customers
were to demand mobile TI equivalents (with a data rate of 1.5 Mbps).
(3) Investment and Innovation

The FCC desires that its policy toward the CMRS spectrum cap
"promotes, rather than impedes, the introduction of innovative
services and technological advances." 70 Unfortunately, the spectrum
cap may retard investment and innovation through myriad effects.
First, wireless service providers must compete with other industries
for capital. To the extent that the spectrum cap prohibits wireless
carriers from operating in the most efficient manner, investors will
commit their capital elsewhere. Second, the cap may lead companies
to delay entry. If the minimum efficient scale exceeds the cap,
potential carriers may strategically delay entry until the cap is lifted.
Third, the cap may inhibit exit from the wireless industry. With the
cap in place, a 30 MHz firm may be forced to find two or more
buyers, as the potential acquirer may be close to the cap itself. Future
entrants would rationally anticipate the "exit problem" and would
69. See Aldo Morri, 3G Migration:Waitingfor the Wave, WIRELESS REVIEW, at *1.
5 5.
70. Spectrum Cap NPRM, supranote5,
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therefore be less willing to enter and invest ex ante.71
C. The Enforcement Costs Associated with the FCC's Failure to Allow At
Least One Carrierto Use More Than 45 MHz of Spectrum

If the 45 MHz spectrum cap becomes a binding constraint on
carriers' optimal spectrum utilization, the equilibrium scale of carriers
in the face of the cap will be less than socially optimal. Barring the
removal of the spectrum cap, the FCC would be forced into the
undesirable position of conducting a separate wireless data services
auction. This option would entail substantial transactions costs (such
as determining which portion of the spectrum to sell, conducting
bidder seminars, and conducting the auction) and directly contradict
the FCC's prior objective of not dictating how spectrum should be
used. In addition, the artificial bifurcation of wireless voice and data
delivery would deprive consumers of the potential savings that could
be realized if carriers could offer voice and data over the same
spectrum. Retention of the spectrum cap would also entail
administrative costs tied directly to compliance with the cap. These
costs would include costs imposed on a carrier in attempting to
determine compliance and, in the event of an inability to comply
under its business plans, formulation of alternatives. The FCC would
incur corresponding administrative costs.
IV. The Expected Costs of Retaining the Cap Exceed the
Expected Costs of Removing It
We can envision either of two alternative scenarios developing in
the wireless service industry, each of which would require the FCC's
abolition of the 45MHz spectrum cap. First, the wireless market could
divide into various niches, with some firms serving voice only, data
only, business only, or some combination of the three.7 2 Second, the
demand for bundled services could be so strong that the only way for
a firm to compete effectively would be to aggregate more than 45
MHz of spectrum.
In the first scenario, where the industry splits apart into various
niche offerings, 45 MIHz would be insufficient for the subset of firms
71. It is well recognized that a barrier to exit becomes a barrier to entry. See WILLIAM
J.

BAUMOL ET AL.,

CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND

THE THEORY

OF INDUSTRY

STRuCTuRE 6-7 (1988).

72. This phenomenon may already be occurring. For example, Cellular One does not
appear to be following the same pricing strategies of its competitors in the Washington,
D.C. area. Rather than reducing prices across for all levels of usage, Cellular One is
offering additional lines for family members with free weekend airtime. Perhaps this
strategy is an indication that the wireless market will segment into business and family
usage.
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wishing to provide bundled services or to invade the fixed-services
market. A single 10 MHz carrier providing voice services alone could
still provide the pricing discipline necessary to defeat any attempt at
monopolization by a multiproduct firm or any attempt at cartelization
by multiple firms. The marginal customer would abandon the bundle
of services in the face of excessive prices because, for that customer,
the voice-only applications would be substitutes for those bundled
services.
In the second scenario, where the demand for bundled services
overwhelms existing capacity, all firms would require more than 45
MiHz to supply services efficiently. Hence, a single 10 MHz carrier
could not exert pricing discipline in the face of attempted
monopolization or cartelization. But in this second scenario, the
FCC's entire regulatory framework for CMRS spectrum would rest
on the misconception that the 45 MHz spectrum cap was not a
binding constraint on the efficient production of wireless services.
Confronted with that erroneous premise, the FCC would need to
allocate additional spectrum so that multiple firms could efficiently
produce services under the new competitive paradigm. Thus, under
either scenario, the FCC would be better served by removing the cap.
Regardless of whether some or all firms would optimally choose
to employ more than 45 MHz, the FCC's retention of the 45 MHz
spectrum cap would thwart one of the principal functions 73served by
market forces-namely, to produce and reveal information.

If the spectrum cap were eliminated and a Type I error occurred,
the FCC at least would become aware of the problem and could take
steps to remedy the harm to the public interest. In contrast, if the
spectrum cap were retained and a Type II error occurred, it is
possible that the FCC would never learn that it was preventing the
optimal input selection of wireless firms. Such information is
extremely valuable for the FCC to have at its disposal, as it would
assist the agency in redefining its spectrum allocation policy in the
manner most conducive to the public interest.
The goal for which the FCC devised the 45 MHz CMRS
spectrum cap has been achieved. The cap should now be abolished.
The probability that a single carrier, or a group of carriers acting
73. As one of us has previously observed:
Competition is the best mechanism for stimulating research and development
and for resolving uncertainty about evolving technology. Technological change
and uncertainty surely characterize the telecommunications industry. As
Friedrich A. Hayek powerfully argued, markets create and process vast
quantities of information, which necessarily would overwhelm the conscious
efforts of any central economic planner.
SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 1, at 523 (citing Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of
Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945)).
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collusively, could exercise market power in a given geographic region
is remote, while the corresponding harms are relatively minor.
Meanwhile, the probability that the minimum efficient scale for at
least one firm exceeds the spectrum cap is nontrivial, and the
resulting loss in efficiency is potentially large. In short, the expected
costs of retaining the cap exceed the expected costs of removing it.
Thus, the FCC would advance the public interest by abolishing the
cap.
V. The General Applicability of the Decision-Theoretic
Framework
The decision-theoretic framework that we have applied to the 45
MHz CMRS spectrum cap can be generalized to address a broad
range of competitive policy issues in the wireless telecommunications
industry. In most competitive policy matters, regulators must strike a
delicate balance between anticompetitive concerns and potential
gains in efficiency and innovation. We can broadly define the Type I
error as the regulator's failure to deter a harmful event. In contrast,
the Type II error can be broadly defined as the regulator's failure to
allow a beneficial event. Define p as the probability of a Type I error,
q as the probability of a Type II error, L as the losses associated with
a Type I error, and Lm as the losses associated with a Type II error.
Figure 8 demonstrates the decision tree.
FIGURE 8: DECISION TREE FOR COMPETITIVE POLICY
ANALYSIS
ACCEPTr
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The darkened node represents the stage at which the regulator
decides to accept or reject a policy. The lightened nodes represent the
stage at which "nature" decides whether the Type I or Type II error
occurs. As Figure 8 shows, the regulator must weigh the expected loss
of the Type I error against the expected costs of the Type II error.
The decision rule simplifies to "accept the policy if the pLi < pLii."
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The decision rule can be applied to a broad class of competitive
issues in the wireless industry. For example, suppose two wireless
firms were considering a merger that would result in the reduction of
a competitor in at least one geographic region. In this case, the policy
issue is whether or not the merged firms should be forced to divest its
wireless licenses in the overlap territories. According to the decisiontheoretic framework, the merged firms should be forced to divest if
the expected costs of allowing the firms to retain the properties
exceed the expected costs of forcing the firms to divest.
The expected costs of allowing the merged firms to retain the
properties is the product of (1) the probability that the merged firms
will exert market power within a particular overlap region and (2) the
sum of the associated loss in consumer welfare and the enforcement
costs of remedying that loss. The expected costs of forcing the firms to
divest the properties is the product of (1) the probability that the
merged firms could reduce its costs through economies of scope and
scale and (2) the sum of the efficiency losses and the enforcement
costs of remedying those efficiency losses. The calculation of the
expected costs in this instance can be performed in identical fashion
to the spectrum cap application.
Fortunately, many of the same factors that influence the decision
process in the spectrum cap rule resurface in the divestiture matter.
The probability that the merged firms will exercise market power
within an overlap region is largely a function of competition in the
wireless services industry, the existence of nationwide competitors,
the availability of capacity-expanding equipment, falling entry
barriers, the durable nature of spectrum, and the efficacy of
warehousing spectrum. The loss in consumer welfare resulting from
an exercise of market power is a function of the elasticity of demand
for wireless services. Likewise, the probability that the merged firms
will be able to reduce costs by taking advantage of economies of
scope and scale is a function of growing demand for wireless data
applications and increasing landline penetration. The loss in
efficiency depends on wireless firms' production technologies.
Because the aforementioned factors are identical to those used in
the spectrum-cap decision analysis, the results of the merger analysis
should approximate the results derived above, namely, a small
probability that the merged firms will exert market power, a small
loss in consumer welfare resulting from the exercise of market power,
a nontrivial probability that the merged firms will not be able to
achieve economies of scope and scale but for the divestiture of
overlap licenses, and a large loss in efficiency resulting from the
divestiture. Furthermore, because those factors are not specific to any
one region or firm, one would expect the calculations to be the same
for a broad range of merger possibilities. Therefore, barring any
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dramatic change in the underlying factors, the application of the
decision rule would likely demonstrate in most merger scenarios that
the expected costs of forcing the merged firms to divest will exceed
the expected costs of allowing the merged firms to retain licenses in
overlap territories.
Conclusion
Application of decision-theoretic analysis reveals the expected
costs of retaining the FCC's 45 MHz spectrum cap exceed the
expected costs of removing it. The expected cost of removing the cap
is the product of (1) the probability that a single carrier, or a group of
carriers acting collusively, could exercise market power and (2) the
sum of the associated loss in consumer welfare and the enforcement
costs of remedying the loss. The expected cost of keeping the
spectrum cap is the product of (1) the probability that the minimum
efficient scale for at least one firm exceeds the spectrum cap and (2)
the sum of the efficiency losses and the enforcement costs of
remedying those efficiency losses.
Our conclusion, grounded in competitive analysis and decision
theory, is consistent with the FCC's belief that "trusting in the
operation of market forces generally better serves the public interest
than regulation." 74 The probability that a single carrier, or a group of
carriers acting collusively, could exercise market power in a given
geographic region is remote, while the corresponding harms are
relatively minor. Meanwhile, the probability that the minimum
efficient scale for at least one firm exceeds the spectrum cap is
nontrivial, and the resulting loss in efficiency is potentially large.
Thus, the FCC would advance the public interest by abolishing the
cap, because the expected costs of retaining the cap exceed the
expected costs of removing it.
Of all the trends that we have identified in the wireless industry,
none is more significant from a competition policy perspective than
landline displacement by wireless services. The increasing
substitutability of wireless and wireline services is blurring the
definitions of the relevant product market in the telecommunications
industry. When regulators or antitrust enforcers or courts assess the
market power of a fixed service provider, they must now ask whether
an increase in the price of fixed service will result in the marginal
customer selecting a competitive wireless carrier. Likewise, when a
regulator sets the price that an incumbent local exchange carrier may
charge to lease an unbundled network element to competitive local
exchange carriers (CLEC), one must ask how much it would cost the
74. Spectrum Cap NPRM, supranote 5,

5.
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CLEC to serve the same customers with a wireless network. Wireless
service providers are telecommunications firms that need not wait for
regulators to resolve the contentious issue of unbundling.

